
#### CDC CARTEL DAMAGE CLAIMS<sup>TM</sup> THE EUROPEAN BRAND FOR PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

# **Private Antitrust Enforcement**

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# Overview



"The overall number of antitrust damage claims in the EU is raising significantly so that no action is required..."

## ■ Facts:

- Follow-on actions only in 25% of all COM cases, significantly lower percentage for NCA cases
- Overall damage amount claimed are nowhere close to damage foregone by victims of in EU of up to €23 billion in 2012 alone (COM estimate)
- Focus on small number of jurisdictions (Austria, Finland, Germany, Netherlands and United Kingdom)
- Individual claimants typically large companies or public entities
- Bundling of claims by specilised entities
- Large part of justified damage claims still foregone (in particular SMEs and consumers), resulting in perpetuation of illegal benefit for cartel members

Myths & facts regarding private enforcement in the EU "Private enforcement results in 'ambulance chasing' and unmeritorious claims..."

## ■ Facts:

In EU virtually always follow-on actions to cartel decision by competition authorities


Myths & facts regarding private enforcement in the EU

- Very careful *ex-ante* assessment of claimants due to legal and economic risks involved in potentially long-lasting litigation
- Information asymmetry and lack of data/evidence
- High upfront administrative and cost burden for claimants
- Procedural tactics by defendants to delay proceedings
- Some claimant/funding firms have already exited 'the market', others have only brought one single antitrust damage action
- Current risks inherent in litigation preclude bringing of unmeritorious cases

Myths & facts regarding private enforcement in the EU

- "Private damage claims are targeted at leniency applicants and therefore have a negative effect on leniency programmes..."
   Facts:
  - In practice: No chilling effect observed on leniency programmes
  - Immunity from fines remains a significant incentive to apply for immunity/lenieny
  - Damage actions typically brought against several cartel members and not solely against leniency applicant, other cartel members often drawn into litigation by third party notifications etc.
  - Leniency applicants do submit artificial appeals against fining decision in order to avoid binding effect
  - Leniency applicants can claim for contribution against other cartelists
  - Decisive factors for claimants where and against whom to bring an action are:
    - Effectiveness and reliability of judicial system, incl. costs
    - Relevant case law and precedents

# **Bundling of claims at material level as effective way of enforcing antitrust damage claims across the EU**



#### Advantages:

- Outsourcing of enforcement to specialised entity
- Ongoing business relationships not harmed
- Access to data of multitude of cartel victims helps to overcome information asymmetry
- Creation of synergies for victims, defendants and court systems of MS
- Increases chances to obtain fair compensation and enforce claims in and out-of court which otherwise would be foregone (e.g. SMEs)

Method practiced across the EU and specifically recognised for antitrust damage claims by courts in D, NL, A, FIN, F Development of consistent case law across EU Member States

# Development of common approach of national courts to key procedural and substantive issues in follow-on damage claims

- Jurisdiction: Confirmation of applicability of Art. 6(1) and Art. 5(3)
  Brussels I Regulation to follow-on damage actions
- Nature of antitrust damage claims and basic principles of liability
  - Non-contractual / tortious nature of claims
  - Joint & several liability of cartel members
  - Parent/subsidiary liability (personal responsibility of 'economic unit')
- Confirmation of standing of direct and indirect purchasers
- Interpretation of limitation periods in light of effectiveness principle
- Estimation of damages and passing-on defence
  - Wide range of quantification methods
  - Legal assumption that cartels result in damage
  - Narrow applicability of passing-on defence
- > Many aspects incorporated in draft EU directive

# Key judgments in the EU

#### Austria

- Supreme Court, judgment of 14 February 2012 5 Ob 39/11 *Lifts & Escalators*
- Supreme Court, judgment of 2 August 2012 4 Ob 46/12m *Hobex*
- Supreme Court, judgment of 20 November 2012 5 Ob 123/12t *Payment cards*

#### Finland

■ Helsinki District Court, judgment of 4 July 2013 – 11/16750 – CDC HP vs Kemira

#### Germany

- Higher Regional Court Berlin, judgment of 1 October 2009 2 U 17/03 *Readymix concrete*
- Higher Regional Court Karlsruhe, judgment of 11 June 2010 6 U 118/05 (Kart) ORWI
- Federal Supreme Court, judgment of 28 June 2011- KZR 75/10 ORWI

#### Netherlands

- District Court Arnhem, judgments of 26 October 2011 and 16 January 2013 Ref. 208814 and 208812 - Tennet vs. Alstom and Tennet vs. ABB
- District Court The Hague, judgment of 1 May 2013 Ref. 414499 CDC vs Shell et al
- Court of Appeal Amsterdam, judgment of 24 September 2013 Ref. 200.109.253/01 Equlib vs KLM et al

Development of consistent case law across EU Member States

# Key judgments in the EU

Spain

Supreme Court, judgment of 24 June 2012- 344/2012 - Acor

## United Kingdom (selection)

- Provimi vs Aventis, [2003] EWHC 961
- Devenish Nutrition vs Sanofi Aventis, [2007] EWHC 2394 and [2008] EWCA Civ 1086
- Cooper Tire vs Shell Chemicals, [2009] EWHC 2609 and [2010] EWCA Civ 864
- Emerald Supplies vs British Airways [2009] EWHC 741 and [2010] EWCA 1284
- National Grid vs ABB, [2009] EWHC 1326 and [2012] EWHC 869
- Toshiba Carrier vs KME, [2011] EWHC 2665 and [2012] EWCA Civ 1190
- Bord Na Mona vs BPI, [2012] EWHC 3346
- 2 Travel vs Cardiff Bus, [2012] CAT 19
- Deutsche Bahn vs Morgan Crucible, [2013] CAT 18
- > Austria currently the MS with the most advanced case-law

Development of consistent case law across EU Member States

## **COM** proposal overall positive...

- Codification of *aquis communautaire*
- Clarification of standing for direct and indirect purchasers
- Importance of principles of effectiveness and equivalence
- Binding nature of national and COM decisions
- Clear rules on limitation
- Confirmation of joint & several liability of cartel members
- Limitation of liability of immunity applicant to own 'share of harm' as effective incentive for first fully cooperative cartel member
- Rebuttable presumption of harm
- Damage claim includes
  - Price overcharge
  - Interest as of date of damaging event
  - Loss of profit
- Focus on out of court settlements, e.g. suspensive effect of consensual dispute resolution

Comments on the EU draft directive

## • ... however, COM proposal could be improved:

- Access to evidence
  - Per se prohibition of access to leniency statements and settlement submissions not in line with *Donau Chemie* judgment (C-536/11)
  - Better: General proportionality test subject to court control
- Clarification of 'confidential information' and 'business secrets': facts relating to infringement and commercial interest not to be sued for damages do not deserve protection
- Passing-on defence to be excluded if claims from further down the distribution chain are *de facto* impossible or unfeasible (e.g. low value & dispersed claims) in order to prevent unjust enrichment of cartel members
- Effective settlement mechanism in Art. 101 infringements requires final legal certainty for settling parties across EU jurisdictions and thus objective definition of 'share of the harm' (volumes criteria)

Comments on the EU draft directive

# Full transparency regarding facts of the infringement by publication of meaningful prohibition decisions

- Potential victims could assess *ex-ante* whether they are harmed and whether they want to claim for damages
- Avoidance of lengthy access to evidence litigation before MS courts

## Protection of rights of victims in the context of public settlements

- Publication of little or significantly less information on the infringement as real incentive for entering into public settlements
- Current situation = bargaining to the detriment of third parties' fundamental rights (Art. 17 and 47 EU Charta)

### Critical assessment of the 'success' of leniency programmes

- Conflict between public and private enforcement not proven
- Leniency programmes can be strategically used against competitors; they inherently favour larger, well advised undertakings
- Focus of authorities taken away from investigation of infringements which are really harmful to EU economy (e.g. raw material cartels)?

What is missing?

## Guidance on interest calculation

- Interest is a key aspect of damage claims, in particular in long-lasting cartels/damage proceedings
- Cross-border effects of EU-wide cartels might result in parallel application of national laws from various MS
- Significant differences and changes over time in applicable laws
- Guidance/standards required for national judges in Art. 101/102 infringements in order to provide legal certainty for all parties and avoid lengthy litigation
- Central register/website of all cartel decisions published by EU competition authorities (COM and NCAs)
  - Central website accessible for potential victims across the EU
  - Public version of original decision
  - English summary of key facts of infringement
  - Could be implemented in the context of the ECN

What is missing?



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